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People and rules·Chapter 16

What can go wrong

Read this before locking anything.

  • The pool may be small. It fills only from trading fees. With little trading there is little to pay out, and a reload can be scaled down to very little or nothing.
  • The token can fall. Your tier is fixed in dollars when you lock, but what you get back at the end is tokens, at whatever they are worth then.
  • Attesters read exchanges from outside. They cannot see inside a centralised exchange. A hedge there is invisible, which is why payouts are capped well below what was locked.
  • Attester security follows the token price. Bonds are in $RELOAD. In a crash they count for less, exactly when liquidations pile up, so honest claims may have to wait for more bond or a recovery.
  • The price feed needs someone to keep it alive. If the observers stop, new locks, buybacks and claims wait. Withdrawals do not.
  • Observers are trusted with the price feed. A stolen observer wallet could nudge the recorded price by up to a fifth a day, which skews new locks and buybacks by that much, or pause the feed, which holds up claims until a vote lifts the pause. It cannot take funds or touch a withdrawal.
  • Pons can redirect the fees. Pons' contracts let its owner change any token's fee recipient with three days' notice. And until the launch wallet hands the role to the forwarder contract, that wallet is the recipient.
  • Not every venue counts. Five of the twelve exchanges are on at launch: Hyperliquid, Lighter, GMX v2, Ostium and Aster. On Aster a liquidation cannot be verified, so it is not paid. The others stay off until an account there can prove who owns it, or until it can be read safely.
  • Nothing is paid on a partial look. If a switched-on exchange or a wallet's history cannot be read in full, or the account's equity at the liquidation cannot be established from the exchange's own records, the claim is not signed. It is tried again every half hour for 72 hours. Some causes do not clear: an account with an enormous trade history, or a GMX v2 or Ostium position that was changed after the liquidation.
  • Early trading is thin. The pool opens with about $8,000 of depth. Prices move easily and buybacks are small until it grows.
  • USDG has an issuer. Its issuer can freeze an address. That is outside anyone's control here.
  • Robinhood runs the chain. Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit chain with a single sequencer, operated by Robinhood, which decides which transactions get in and when. Arbitrum's forced-inclusion path lets a transaction the sequencer ignores be pushed through from the parent chain after a delay, so nothing can be locked away for good, but a claim's 72-hour window could pass in the meantime, and this protocol's transactions could be singled out.
  • The code is unaudited. It is tested, and it has been rehearsed end to end, but no outside firm has reviewed it.
  • Voters can make poor choices. Inside the hard ranges, a small turnout can still move a setting.
  • A large majority can replace supporting contracts. Two-thirds of the vote, with 15% taking part, can swap the referee contract or the price feed for a new one. A dishonest replacement could approve false claims or waste the buyback fund. It takes a public vote and a two-day wait, and the Guardian can cancel it in the first 180 days. The pool and the staking contract can never be replaced. Early on, when little is locked, a large majority can be a small number of tokens, which is what the Guardian is for.